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When the Virtuous Circle Unravels: Unfair Service Provision
and State De-legitimation in Divided Societies
Claire Mcloughlin
International Development Department, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK
ABSTRACT
The mutually reinforcing ‘virtuous circle’ of service provision and
state legitimacy posited in prominent statebuilding models can
unravel when citizens perceive unfair service processes or
distribution. In Sri Lanka, changes to university access catalysed an
ongoing process of state de-legitimation among the Tamil
minority. Coveted services are lucrative legitimacy commodities
that can cater to the core legitimacy audience, leading to
perceptions of unfairness among excluded groups. This can have
wider de-legitimizing eﬀects through signalling the state’s
operative values and norms. In already divided societies, whether
services support or undermine state legitimacy can hinge on
competing perceptions of fairness.
KEYWORDS
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Introduction
Prominent statebuilding models depict a virtuous circle – or mutually reinforcing, positive
relationship – between improved state capacity for public service provision and enhanced
state legitimacy (DFID 2010; OECD 2008). Recent research has begun to empirically inter-
rogate this logic, testing whether and under what conditions vital services – including
health, water, education, and social protection – improve citizens’ perceptions of the
state’s right to rule (Carpenter, Slater, and Mallet 2012; Fisk and Cherney 2016; Mcloughlin
2015b). The main ﬁnding from this emerging literature is that the relationship between
service provision and state legitimacy is neither automatic nor straightforward. Rather, it
hinges on certain normative and historically contingent criteria against which citizens
judge the quality of the services provided to them. The history of what the state has pro-
vided in the past can inﬂuence perceptions of what it should rightfully provide in the
present, forming a baseline of assessment (Nixon and Mallet 2017) that may depend on
perceptions of distributive justice in the allocation of services between groups, as well
as on whether or not decision-making and implementation processes are judged to be
procedurally fair (Mcloughlin 2015b). These ﬁndings have begun to lay the groundwork
for a more nuanced, normative understanding of the received wisdom that services
necessarily improve legitimacy.
If, as emerging research indicates, services may improve state legitimacy when certain
normative criteria are fulﬁlled, it is not inconceivable that they may undermine it when
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delivered in ways that challenge those same normative criteria. Yet, while the idea that
service provision improves state legitimacy has been empirically investigated, this
reverse proposition – that services might under certain conditions de-legitimize a state
– remains curiously neglected. This stems partly from the policy origins of this research
agenda, which grew out of a concern with understanding the potential eﬀects of external
aid on peace and stability in fragile and conﬂict-aﬀected states. However, it follows that if
service provision is conceived as signiﬁcant for a state’s legitimacy, there is no intrinsic
reason why its inﬂuence should be exclusively positive. Indeed, some evidence from
fragile states suggests the opposite – that service provision is frequently a source of every-
day grievance and contestation between competing groups which, particularly in divided
societies, can exacerbate social tensions and fuel instability (Baird 2010; Alexandre et al.
2012). Viewed in this light, the virtuous circle appears not only theoretically lopsided
but empirically naïve.
This article takes up these concerns and asks when service provision can have the oppo-
site eﬀect of de-legitimizing a state. Based on a review of evidence from fragile and
conﬂict-aﬀected states and an in-depth qualitative case study of the link between edu-
cation and state de-legitimation among Tamils in Sri Lanka, it examines why and how
the virtuous circle can unravel. It argues that under certain political conditions service
delivery can undermine state legitimacy when it is perceived as procedurally or distribu-
tionally unfair. In the Sri Lankan case, changes to the rules governing access to university
education helped to de-legitimize the state among the already excluded Tamil minority.
During the critical juncture of 1970 to 1974, reforms to university entrance criteria had
a catalytic eﬀect on the militarization of Tamil youth and the resort to calls for a separate
Tamil state in the north of the island. These mobilizations were important precursors to Sri
Lanka’s devastating civil war between the Sinhalese state and the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which spanned more than 25 years (1983–2009). The contested univer-
sity reforms can themselves be interpreted as an escalation of a postcolonial legitimation
practice of pursuing social justice for the Sinhalese masses. The ostensible pursuit of fair-
ness for this majority in turn collided with, and undermined, the perceptions of fairness of
the Tamil minority, who viewed changes to the entry criteria as normatively unjustiﬁable in
both a distributive and a procedural sense. This service-level unfairness was evaluated and
magniﬁed in the context of pre-existing perceptions of unfairness and state discrimination
among this minority. Perceptions of acute unfairness in the education arena quickly had
wider signalling eﬀects, becoming an emblem of state illegitimacy and a rallying cry for
anti-state mobilization.
This case and the wider literature suggest qualiﬁcations to the model of the virtuous
circle and point to a number of testable propositions about when services undermine
legitimacy. They highlight that the relationship between service delivery and state legiti-
macy does not hang free of political context; in practice, it may be actively politically
engineered. In divided societies with legacies of inequality, highly coveted services can
become lucrative political commodities which political elites may have strong incentives
to manipulate in order to maximize legitimacy among their core constituency. In the
context of pre-existing conﬂict, this political process of engineering can generate a back-
lash among excluded groups who hold competing perceptions of fairness. These percep-
tions of unfairness in relation to either the process through which services are allocated or
the anticipated distributional eﬀects of those decisions – independent of any eventual
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material outcomes or lived experience – can undermine the normative basis for state
legitimacy. Perceptions of unfairness in even a narrow service arena can have wider
eﬀects on perceptions of overall legitimacy because services convey the state’s operative
values and norms: in essence, the normative basis for its legitimacy.
Methodologically, these insights arise out of a politically grounded, historical account of
the relationship between the provision of a highly desired good and a process of state de-
legitimation over time. This departs from the hitherto dominant method for researching
the services–legitimacy relationship, which has primarily involved measuring correlations
between perceptions of legitimacy and objective measures of service provision at narrow
snapshots in time (Mcloughlin 2015a). Viewing the services–legitimacy relationship
through a wider temporal lens reveals both sides of the legitimation equation – both
how states may engineer access to services as part of ongoing legitimation practices
and the subsequent eﬀects of these practices on citizens’ legitimacy evaluations (Zaum
2013). Understanding the role of services in legitimation is operationalized in the
present study through archival research that involved retrieving and analysing policy
documentation, political speeches, parliamentary records, and news media reports
related to the history, evolution, and political signiﬁcance of university education in Sri
Lanka over more than a decade. To examine the eﬀect of service changes on legitimacy
perceptions,1 more than 250 newspaper articles, opinion pages, and columns were ana-
lysed covering public reaction to key reforms during the period of interest.2 This documen-
tary and public sphere analysis was then triangulated through a series of over 50 key
informant interviews conducted in Sri Lanka between 2012 and 2016. The sample includes
past and contemporary political elites, retired government oﬃcials, academics, and
(former) students from both the Tamil and the Sinhalese groups, who gave ﬁrst-hand, nar-
rative accounts of the signiﬁcance of education to processes of state legitimation and de-
legitimation.
The article proceeds as follows. It ﬁrst sets the scene by critically evaluating the virtuous
circle in light of recent research on the relationship between service delivery and state
legitimacy in divided societies. It then examines, through the use of an in-depth case
study of education and state de-legitimation in Sri Lanka, how and why this virtuous
circle can unravel. Based on these combined insights, it then puts forward testable prop-
ositions on the political and normative conditions under which services may undermine
legitimacy. Finally, it concludes by summarizing the case for a more political, normative,
and temporal perspective on the services–legitimacy relationship, arguing that competing
perceptions of fairness may be pivotal to understanding the circumstances under which
services may harm perceptions of a state’s legitimacy and exacerbate conﬂict.
Reversing the logic of the virtuous circle
The underlying logic of the virtuous circle follows what scholars have terms an ‘instrumen-
talist’ view of statebuilding (Lemay-Hébert 2009). In the OECD’s (2008) account of the
causal chain, for example, states with the requisite capacity to provide services in line
with citizens’ expectations are rewarded with enhanced legitimacy, and legitimacy in
turn increases citizens’ compliance with the state’s rules. Over time, this compliance
not only makes the task of governing less costly but simultaneously boosts the state’s
capacity to deliver more services more eﬀectively, in turn generating improved legitimacy.
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This conceptualization squarely aligns with so-called output legitimacy – that is, a source of
legitimacy derived from meeting people’s everyday basic needs and governing for the
people (Scharpf 1999). From this perspective, the role assigned to service provision in
improving state legitimacy is primarily via its material eﬀects: services matter for legitimacy
because they improve people’s social conditions and prospects for well-being. This also
aligns with Weber’s (1962) legal–rational category of legitimate authority, which is distinct
from the legitimacy derived from the processes through which power is acquired and/or
exercised, and from the underlying norms and traditions that may guide these processes.
Categorizing service delivery as output-based legitimacy has subsequently infused devel-
opment policy, wherein similar distinctions are made between how the state acts and
what it delivers as discrete sources of legitimacy (World Bank 2011).
Recent research has begun to qualify this instrumental framing of the link between
eﬀective service provision and legitimacy by identifying certain normative conditions
that may ﬁrst need to be in place (Schmelzle and Stollenwerk 2018). These conditions
drill into the meaning of eﬀectiveness in relation to service delivery, revealing the value
judgements that underlie it. Crude measures of access to services do not strongly correlate
with people’s perceptions of the state’s rightfulness (Nixon and Mallet 2017). To be viewed
as eﬀective, and acceptable, questions of what services are provided and to whom may
have to ﬁrst satisfy certain social goals which are shared between societies and governing
institutions seeking legitimacy (Schmelzle and Stollenwerk, this issue). Legitimacy, at its
core, is always derived from value-based judgements – and these values are what
Scharpf (1999) terms the common good or Beetham (1991) the common interest. Speciﬁ-
cally in relation to service delivery, perceptions of distributive justice (who beneﬁts) and
procedural fairness (through what decision-making process) have been identiﬁed as
important shared values across a range of contexts (Mcloughlin 2015b). Hence, while
the mere presence of a service may not inﬂuence legitimacy, aspects of how services
are delivered – particularly the availability of a grievance mechanism – are signiﬁcant in
shaping people’s perceptions of the state (Nixon and Mallet 2017). Together, these
ﬁndings challenge the bracketing of service delivery as merely a material or instrumental
output, suggesting that services are also a marker of whether or not the state is acting in
ways that are normatively acceptable.
A further set of preconditions for the virtuous circle to take hold relates to the connec-
tions between this normative assessment of services and citizens’ overall legitimacy per-
ceptions. An important consideration here is how easily ordinary citizens can credit or
blame the state for the eﬀectiveness of service provision. This may depend on the
state’s visibility at the point of service access, which may aﬀect citizens’ (positive or nega-
tive) attributions. It may also depend on the characteristics of the service itself. In complex
services (e.g. curative health) information asymmetries between doctor and patient may
aﬀect the ability of citizens to judge the quality of what is being delivered to them, for
example (Batley and Mcloughlin 2015). Even where eﬀective services are readily assessable
and attributable to the state, there remains the question of how speciﬁc perceptions of
eﬀectiveness in a single sector translate into a more diﬀuse type of moral approval that
underlies the state’s right to rule (Easton 1975). This is what Schmelzle and Stollenwerk
(this issue) term the problem of generalizability – from service to state as a whole. These
links between service eﬀectiveness and legitimacy are undertheorized and yet central
to the virtuous circle logic.
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If the virtuous circle is conditioned by norms then services may conceivably undermine
legitimacy when they violate these same normative criteria. Theory tells us that, in a broader
sense, state de-legitimation happens when there is misalignment between how the state
exercises its power and the norms which citizens believe should govern that exercise of
power (Beetham 1991). From this perspective, service provision can potentially exacerbate
or catalyse a process of state de-legitimation wherein it creates or ampliﬁes perceptions that
the state is exercising power in ways that are normatively unacceptable. As noted above,
services are not merely evaluated as a technical exercise; they embody and transmit a set
of core values – around process, equity, fairness, and rights. Legitimacy theorists have for
some time therefore argued that partiality and bias in service delivery can threaten legiti-
macy. Beetham (1991), for example, argues that services which are distributed to favour
certain political constituencies may contravene the common interest principle that underlies
legitimacy; the unequal distribution of service provision may exacerbate the problem of
(perceived) relative deprivation (Easton 1975). Some statebuilding scholars argue that con-
sistent partiality in the distribution of state goods can prevent the very emergence of a social
contract (Holsti 1996). Together, these theoretical insights suggest that an exclusively posi-
tive framing of the virtuous circle may be unjustiﬁably lopsided.
The alternative proposition – that service provision might also undermine legitimacy –
ﬁnds (albeit limited) empirical support in contemporary areas of limited statehood, where
research has begun to show that the virtuous circle is at best elusive and at worst empiri-
cally naive. Identity-based exclusion and a weak political commitment to equitable service
provision are hallmark features of divided societies (Baird 2010). Surveys indicate that per-
ceptions of injustice and unfairness accompany popular disillusionment with and detach-
ment from the state (Alexandre et al. 2012). In the same way that material rewards may
signal the state’s commitment to the welfare of its citizens, unequal or exclusionary
access to public goods can be interpreted as a signal of neglect (Dix, Hussmann, and
Walton 2012; Bleck and Michelitch 2015). Indeed, in some divided societies, poor
service provision and contested legitimacy appear to be locked into a vicious rather
than virtuous circle. Recent case evidence from northern Mali is illustrative of this
dynamic: here, exclusion from service access perpetuates a cycle of poor state presence,
uneven service access, contested legitimacy, and instability (Wee et al. 2014). Political com-
mitment is often at the heart of this cycle. Politicians may have little incentive to provide
services to minority or marginalized communities that are not core constituencies for the
state (Hamilton and Svensson 2014), and the state, in turn, may need to expend more
resources containing dissent from these groups through coercive measures, thus reducing
its capacity for eﬀective service provision (Min and Golden 2014). In this way, a vicious
circle of weak legitimacy, poor performance, and non-compliance can become self-
reinforcing in the same way that a virtuous circle can. While these empirical insights
remain potted, they nevertheless indicate the possibility that service provision may
violate rather than support the fulﬁlment of shared values, and that exclusion from
speciﬁc services may reinforce a generalized sense of disillusionment with the state.
Education and state de-legitimation in Sri Lanka
The case of education in Sri Lanka provides a graphic illustration of this potential for a
negative relationship between services and legitimacy. In a broad sense, this case sits in
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a paradoxical category of states that have demonstrated strong eﬀectiveness in delivering
citizen welfare and yet simultaneously experienced signiﬁcant challenges to legitimacy
among certain constituencies (Lipset 1984).3 In the decades after independence, Sri
Lanka was held up as a model of outstanding social development, having displayed excep-
tional performance on measures of service provision and citizen welfare. By 1960, the
country had achieved remarkable progress on poverty reduction, including a life expect-
ancy of 62 years – a feat that would elude many richer countries for at least another
decade (Sen 1981, 295). This performance is widely attributed to Sri Lanka’s extensive pro-
vision of social welfare programmes – from food subsidies to free education and health-
care – initiated by a postcolonial state founded on principles of social justice (Jayasuriya
2010). Alongside these markers of eﬀectiveness, however, violent challenges to state legiti-
macy were mounted both from within the majority Sinhalese constituency – in the form of
two insurrections – and from within the Tamil minority community, culminating in the
armed separatism of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).4 In reference to the vir-
tuous circle then, Sri Lanka appears to be an outlier case5 that – on the surface at least –
contradicts the received wisdom that eﬀective service provision runs neatly in parallel with
improved legitimacy. Indeed, it raises an alternative question of whether and how the
pursuit of welfarism that was so core to the postcolonial state transformation project
may itself have been connected to the process of state de-legiitmation among some
groups.
Events in the education sector during the early 1970s lend support to this alternative
proposition. Political interference in the rules governing access to university education
became a key issue of contention between the increasingly excluded Tamil minority
and the Sinhalese nationalist state during the formative juncture in the lead up to war
between them (C.R. de Silva 1974). A series of reforms were introduced that altered the
criteria for university admissions. Signiﬁcant among them was the incendiary policy of
so-called media-wise standardization, which introduced new qualifying marks that varied
according to the language in which the entrance examinations were taken. Until then, uni-
versity admissions criteria had been based on the principle of merit, or raw marks, in exam-
inations. Under the new standardized rules, the number of students admitted to the
universities would be proportional to the number sitting those examinations in diﬀerent
languages – whether English or one of the two local swabasha languages, Tamil and Sin-
halese. Contemporaries claimed that the students sitting the exam in Tamil or English
would therefore be required to score higher raw marks than those sitting the exam in Sin-
halese (the language of the majority of the population) in order to gain a place at a state
university (C.R. de Silva 1974). In this way, standardization represented an important shift
in an underlying normative principle, from universal merit to positive discrimination on the
basis of language and, by extension, ethnicity.
Although the government subsequently retracted the language-based criteria for uni-
versity entrance,6 this normative shift signiﬁcantly exacerbated an ongoing process of
state de-legitimation among the Tamil minority community (Wickramasinghe 2012).7
Tamil political representatives, students, and civil society organizations reacted with
immediate hostility towards the perceived attempt to engineer university access. In
November 1970, over 10,000 students from Jaﬀna staged a protest, during which they
burned an eﬃgy of the minister of education. They subsequently delivered an ultimatum
to ‘reverse the injustices done to Tamils under the new entrance scheme, or they would
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take further action’; when asked what that further action could mean, a prominent student
leader replied: ‘it can mean anything. We shall show the government what we are capable
of doing’ (‘10,000 Jaﬀna Students Protest against Varsity Admissions’ 1970a). Perceiving
that their long-held right to education was under threat, these reforms aggravated
already militant youth groups – including the Tamil Students Federation (TSF) – who
would go on to violently challenge the state’s legitimacy (Wilson 2011).8 The reaction
of youth groups was particularly signiﬁcant because they were later described as ‘the
most militant agitators for separatism’ and ‘a substantial and very volatile element in
Tamil society’ (K.M. de Silva 1981, 551).
As described in further detail below, the signiﬁcance of the changes in education policy
to state legitimacy in the Sri Lankan case is intimately related to the political history of the
post-independence state transformation process and the special role of education within
it. These speciﬁc reforms can be viewed as an escalation of the political engineering of
access to education as a part of a wider political legitimation project designed to court
the state’s primary legitimacy audience of the (majority) Sinhalese. However, the given
normative justiﬁcations for this interference, in turn, had a splintering eﬀect on legitimacy.
Reforms framed as the pursuit of fairness for this majority were received as unfair both dis-
tributionally and procedurally by the minority. Although in one sense narrow – conﬁned to
a single sector and directly aﬀecting potential university entrants – these reforms had a
disproportional eﬀect on state–society relations because they were highly symbolic of,
and in turn reinforced by, wider pre-existing perceptions of state discrimination and bias.
Education as a political legitimacy commodity
Education has a particular history and social meaning in Sri Lanka that inﬂuenced its sig-
niﬁcance to state legitimacy. Extending the right to free education at all was a cornerstone
of Sri Lanka’s post-independence, welfare-oriented social contract (Jayasuriya 2010, 76).
Access to university has historically been viewed as an avenue for breaking through
social hierarchies and accessing (government) employment opportunities (Dunham and
Jayasuriya 2000). In the period leading up to the end of colonial rule in 1948, Sri
Lanka’s education system also came to symbolize the injustices of foreign domination.
Colonialism left a legacy of inequality and linguistic segregation between the English-edu-
cated and the swabasha-educated, as well as widespread imbalances in educational facili-
ties (buildings, laboratories, qualiﬁed teachers) between urban and rural areas (‘Column
515’ 1971b). These inequalities were reﬂected in the universities, at which the majority
of the students in the coveted science faculties came from urban areas (Colombo
South) and Tamil areas (Jaﬀna), while several rural districts – home to the state’s core
legitimacy audience – were signiﬁcantly under-represented (Jayaweera 1969).9 At that
time, education held intrinsic mass appeal and had found a place in the social contract;
consequently, rectifying these education inequalities became core to the pursuit of post-
colonial social justice.
After 1970, a political conjuncture of rising nationalism and violent agitation from
within the majority provided the impetus for the escalation of eﬀorts to rectify these edu-
cational inequalities. A new government – led by the ethno-nationalist Sri Lanka Freedom
Party (SLFP) – came to power, committed to a Sinhalese-Buddhist version of social justice.
Alongside this turn to nationalism, the state faced a legitimacy crisis from within its
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majority constituency which took the form of an armed insurrection orchestrated by Sin-
halese youth who were frustrated with the situation of high unemployment and blocked
social mobility (Moore 1993). As leading historian K.M. de Silva (1981, 541) later recalled,
the insurrection demonstrated that the pace of change towards the vision of social
justice – and fairness for the Sinhalese – had proceeded too slowly. Reforms in higher edu-
cation subsequently took on a new urgency, epitomized by statements made by the min-
ister of education in the days and months after the insurrection that called for quick
reforms: ‘we cannot aﬀord to dilly-dally any longer, so we must take the shortest cut poss-
ible’ (Education System to Be Overhauled 1971).
Political elites revived perceptions of colonial injustice, and the Tamils’ educational
advantage, to rhetorically justify reforming university entrance, their narratives channel-
ling widely held views about the need to re-establish fairness in the education system
(‘Education Lessens Job Prospects’ 1971). A key idea was that if the social justice ideology
of the postcolonial welfare state was to be realized then maximum educational opportu-
nities should be extended to the rural majority Sinhalese – and the proposed standardiz-
ation of marks would counteract the imbalance in science-teaching regions that was
disadvantaging Sinhalese students in particular (C.R. de Silva 1974). In public statements,
standardization was presented as morally justiﬁable if it could overcome ‘the systemic
legacy of division between the elites and the proletariat’ that stemmed from colonialism
(‘MP on Varsity Admissions’ 1970).10 This captures the central normative justiﬁcation for
standardization: levelling the playing ﬁeld for the state’s core legitimacy audience. In
this way, the engineering of the university entrance criteria was a short-cut mechanism
to ‘appease the masses’ and deliver a version of ‘fairness’ to the Sinhalese.11
Competing perceptions of fairness
This pursuit of ostensible fairness and equity for the majority Sinhalese collided with, and
undermined, perceptions of fairness among Tamil groups, who viewed the changes to the
rules as unjustiﬁable and unfair in both a distributive and a procedural sense. In material
terms, Sinhalese admissions increased in the most coveted science and engineering fac-
ulties from 55.9% in 1970 to 62.4% in 1971.12 Alongside these Sinhalese gains, the
Tamils’ share of engineering spaces fell from 24.4% in 1973 to 16.3% in 1974 (C.R. de
Silva 1974).13 However, the immediate hostility towards standardization emerged before
these objective eﬀects could have been felt. It was not so much the eﬀects of the
reforms but the principle of unfair treatment that rallied the already militant Tamil
youth. An election manifesto of the Tamil United Liberation Front14 later described it as
the ‘gravest injustice’ perpetrated against Tamil students. Opinion pages condemned it
as ‘discriminating against a particular community and bestowing undue advantages on
others’ (‘Standardisation Violates a Fundamental Right’ 1970). The president of the
Parents Association of Jaﬀna came to a similar judgement: ‘if standardisation is a euphe-
mism for discriminating against a particular community and bestowing undue advantages
on others, it stands condemned as violating a fundamental human right’. Even if
language-based standardization was conceived by some Sinhalese as positive discrimi-
nation, it was received by many Tamils as blatant racism.15
The given justiﬁcations for standardization were perceived as not only normatively
unacceptable but illogical, by both Tamil and Sinhalese commentators. Even those with
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sympathy for the government’s social justice orientation viewed the engineering of
admissions criteria as illegitimate. It was seen by many as the wrong solution to the
right problem; even though the pursuit of social justice for rural children would ‘be
appreciated by all who have the larger interests of the country at heart’, adjusting entry
based on school facilities would be fairer than adjusting entry based on language
(‘Voice of the People: Standardisation – No Solution’ 1970f). Some called for correcting
the imbalances in the facilities rather than adjusting the criteria for entry. The principal
of Jaﬀna Hindu College raised the following objection: ‘if certain areas lacked facilities
for higher education, it must be remedied forthwith and those children provided with
all amenities for better education rather than denial of admission to children who
deserved a place in the university’ (Babalingham 1971). Others rejected any form of pol-
itical interference in university admissions (‘Alleged Interference with University Admis-
sions. Sen. Kalpage Slates Govt’ 1970b). The principal of the Buddhist Ladies College16
argued: ‘the standardisation should not be in the hands of politicians and partisan bureau-
crats. The standardising process should more properly be in the hands of the university
authorities’. This politicization provoked popular concern that students’ lives should not
be kicked around at the whims and caprices of politicians, ‘otherwise far from blossoming
into the wealth and riches of a future age, they may well become the instruments of event-
ual ruin’ (‘Varsity Admissions’ 1970e). The political manipulation of access to university
was thus considered irresponsible in the context of the existing ethnic tensions.
In an environment where controversies over university admissions were already testing
ethnic relations, the standardization was also criticized as being procedurally unfair. Alle-
gations of bias in the marking of examination scripts had previously surfaced in the press
(‘Entry to Varsity: Discrimination Alleged’ 1970c) and the contested issue of university admis-
sions was already spilling over into violence; peaceful demonstrations over perceived irregu-
larities in admissions were put down by the police using tear gas (‘Strike Over Alleged
Favouritism at Katubedde: Police Tear Gas Students’ 1970d). The new criteria for university
entry were not publicly debated in advance of their introduction. Absent of this, members
of parliament later scrambled for clariﬁcation. In 1971, a Tamil representative17 argued in par-
liament that ‘candidates who sat in the Sinhala medium and obtained 212 marks and above,
and Tamil medium candidates who obtained 232 marks and above’ had been selected for
admission to the Engineering Faculty of the Katubedde Technical College (‘Column 1953’
1971a). He requested that the minister of education ‘state the basis on which the standard-
isation was done’. A subsequent government press release dismissed a ‘wrong impression
that the marks [had] been tampered with’, calling allegations that the entry rules had
been introduced to beneﬁt students of a particular ethnic or religious identity ‘a canard’
(‘Column 515’ 1971b, column 517).18 Nevertheless, it publicly acknowledged for the ﬁrst
time that the pass marks had been adjusted for diﬀerent languages.19 This process of stan-
dardization was later condemned by a cabinet committee as ‘deepening and indeed institu-
tionalising suspicions between communities and promoting distrust in the fairness or
impartiality of public examinations’ (C.R. de Silva 1974, 4).
The signalling eﬀects of perceived unfairness in services
These de-legitimizing eﬀects can only be understood in the context of the expectations of
the rights and entitlements implicit in Sri Lanka’s welfare-based social contract.
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Standardization added to the grievances of the Tamil youth and their political representa-
tives because it signiﬁed the removal of long-held rights and entitlements that were
apparently no longer safeguarded under the social contract. University entry criteria
had veered away from the fundamental principle laid down through the landmark free
education reforms of the Kannangara Committee in 1943 – namely, the right to education.
For Tamils, standardization was not merely a denial of rights but a removal of them. As one
interviewee summarized: ‘Tamils felt they were not getting what they had. It’s a question
of what you had, you know? Privileges were taken away’.20
The removal of the right to education was more acutely felt because educational
achievement, including access to university, had been a long-term symbol of social
status among the Tamil community. In this context, the denial of rights was also seen
as an assault on Tamil identity. This is signiﬁed starkly in the TULF’s manifesto in 1977,
which likens the removal of the right to education to the removal of the very ‘attributes
of nationhood of the Tamil people’ (Kearney 2011, 500). Declining access for Tamil stu-
dents had them driven ‘to the brink of frustration and engulfed with anxiety about
their future’, it claimed; there was no alternative but to end the Sinhalese reign if equality
of opportunity was to be restored, and crucially, ‘if this generation of youth [was] to live as
human beings brimming with self-conﬁdence’. The implied denial of rights had acute sym-
bolic signiﬁcance, as to many Tamils ‘university was a symbol of social prestige and
upwards social mobility’.21 The blow to self-esteem was also acutely felt at an individual
level. Several new applicants under the ﬁrst standardization batch were given entry to col-
leges in lieu of state universities; one such candidate, a former vice chancellor of the Uni-
versity of Jaﬀna who was moved to Moratuwa (at that time a college with no degree
programme), recalls: ‘some of us had nervous breakdowns. A few who could aﬀord it,
went abroad. The vast majority who stayed for lack of any other choice, were radicalised
and moulded into communalists’ (S.R.H. Hoole 2003 ). In the same way that Sinhalese
nationalism fuelled the ostensible pursuit of social justice, standardization provoked
strong recoil to the protection of Tamil national identity.
In a wider political context in which the nationalist state was increasingly perceived as
discriminating against Tamil minority groups, this standardization magniﬁed perceptions
of exclusion. Several areas of public policy had come to symbolize the increasing exclusion
of the Tamil minority from access to state power that was rallying militant Tamil separatism.
Critical among these issues were divisive language policies, a failure to devolve consti-
tutional power, and land settlement disputes.22 Although standardization reﬂected these
wider processes of perceived state discrimination, the removal of the right to education
had a special resonance. It was therefore a tangible and acutely felt blow to the Tamil
youth. One former Tamil student recalls: ‘the riots and even the Citizenship Act were
distant to Tamils in the North East. But standardization was seen even by those who
would never enter university as blocking them out’ (S.R.H. Hoole 2003 ). This was more
acutely felt in the context of scarcity; the economic downturn of the 1970s had exacerbated
a long-term mismatch between demand for, and supply of, higher education (Little and
Hettige 2013), and accessing state universities had become even more meaningful for per-
ceptions of distributive (in)justice in the context of high competition for few spaces.
The removal of the previously held right to education was highly symbolic of a wider
process of state discrimination and, as such, became an emblem of state illegitimacy.
One elite Tamil businessman from a family closely connected to the government of the
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time recalls: ‘it was the prime minister’s betrayal of her closest advisors and friends that
really undermined our status. I mean, Tamils owned a lot of businesses, and the state
needed them. We were running the state, basically’.23 In this way, standardization signalled
not only blocked social mobility but blocked access to power. A Tamil academic later
recalled that ‘what was more alienating and hurtful to the Tamils, was the manner in
which the admissions issue was handled’; the apparent ‘casual arrogance’ of the discrimi-
natory decision-making – absent of consultation and combined with perceived unfairness
– both mirrored and catalysed a wider process of state de-legitimation (R. Hoole 2013 ).
When the virtuous circle unravels
While the multifaceted causes of the de-legitimation of the state among the Tamil minority
are explored elsewhere,24 this in-depth case study shows how the university reforms exacer-
bated the process. It provides a norms-based, politically situated understanding of the
relationship between services provision and legitimacy, and raises some propositions
about the conditions under which the former may undermine rather than support the
latter. These include the degree to which diﬀerent services are political legitimacy commod-
ities, the wider political environment in which they are evaluated, perceptions of (un)fairness
in the assessment of services and the wider signalling eﬀects of this, and the signiﬁcance of
competing understandings of fairness, particularly in divided societies.
The Sri Lankan case indicates that the relationship between service provision and state
de-legitimation is not automatic, but rather politically conditioned. The provision of this
particular service was seen as an expression of social values, as discussed further below,
thus oﬀering fertile ground for making political legitimation claims. The standardization
was viewed as a continuation and escalation of political interference in education that
came in response to a political conjuncture which gave added impetus to delivering
social justice to the majority legitimacy audience. However, education proved to be par-
ticularly fertile rhetorical ground for making legitimacy claims because of its signiﬁcance
in the social contract, the ideas it embodied about social justice and rights, and its
social meaning for individual mobility and group identity. The elites articulated this
meaning through political narratives and rhetoric; in this sense, its signiﬁcance to legiti-
macy was politically manufactured. This recalls the basic idea that all processes of (de-
)legitimation are engineered through interactions between political institutions, elites,
and societies (Leftwich and Hogg 2008). Lipset (1984, 86) more strongly proposes that
legitimacy depends on the state’s capacity to ‘engender andmaintain the belief that exist-
ing institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society’. Future research
may look to the social meaning of diﬀerent services within diﬀerent contexts – derived
partly from this meaning’s role in the social contract – as a basis for understanding
their value as political legitimacy commodities.
In turn, this case highlights how political conditions may form the backdrop of citizens’
assessments of the state’s performance. Sri Lanka’s experience suggests that when a
group is already excluded from access to services and/or power, service provision is eval-
uated in a context of wider mistrust and exclusion (Levi, Sacks, and Tyler 2009). In the
wider political context in which the nationalist state was perceived by Tamils to be increas-
ingly discriminating against them, the standardization brought to the surface and
magniﬁed ‘doubts they [already] harboured about the impartiality of the state in its
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dispensation of social justice’ (Wickramasinghe 2012, 82). In contexts where the wider pol-
itical system is perceived as being fair, seeming deprivation and inequity may otherwise be
tolerated (Jost and Major 2001). On the other hand, the perceived illegitimacy of the state
combined with the perceived illegitimacy of its actions can form a potent combination
that creates a tipping point for justiﬁcatory failure and subsequent de-legitimation
(Kelman 2001). In the Sri Lankan case, the impacts of particularistic reforms in education
were magniﬁed in the context of wider grievances about the inequitable distribution of
resources between diﬀerent groups in society, indicating that the fairness of service pro-
vision is likely to be evaluated in – and cannot be divorced from – the perceived fairness of
the distribution of resources and power in society as a whole.
The relationship between service provision and legitimacy may hinge on perceptions of
the fairness of that service, in either a distributional or a procedural sense. The standard-
ization of university entry in this case provoked a double justiﬁability crisis: a perceived
unfavourable outcome was arrived at by means of a perceived unfair process. This com-
bination is a recognized tipping point for illegitimacy (Kelman 2001). Indeed, the reactions
to the standardization were immediately hostile, not only because the proposed changes
directly threatened material interests but because they lacked any normative justiﬁcation
on process or outcome. This highlights a need to potentially distinguish between percep-
tions and lived reality in understanding how services may inﬂuence legitimacy percep-
tions. As Davies (1962, 8) identiﬁes in his analysis of the cause of revolutions, a crucial
factor motivating rejection of the state is ‘the vague or speciﬁc fear that ground gained
over a long period of time will be quickly lost’. Similarly, surveys of horizontal inequalities
in African countries, for example, have found signiﬁcant mismatches between measurable
inequalities and perceptions of inequalities between groups (Langer and Mikami 2013).
These ﬁndings, along with the in-depth Sri Lankan case, open up the possibility that per-
ceptions of distributive injustice and unfairness may matter as much as lived experience in
relation to the impact on state legitimacy.
These ﬁndings on the signiﬁcance of fairness align with the theory that social motiv-
ations for the conferral or withdrawal of consent extend beyond material self-interest
and maximizing personal rewards (Tyler 2011). Legitimacy ultimately derives from a nor-
mative belief in the moral appropriateness of the state. To be considered legitimate, a
state has to earn the right to rule by using power in ways that are viewed as normatively
appropriate and just (Coicaud 2002; Gilley 2009; Holsti 1996). In other words, it has to
deliver not only what is personally beneﬁcial but what people think is right (Tyler 2000,
2011). By this reading, service provision may undermine legitimacy when it undermines
the moral appropriateness of the state. A similar ﬁnding is made by Fisk and Cherney
(2016) in post-conﬂict Nepal, where people primarily evaluate institutional legitimacy on
the basis of the fairness of decision-making and the quality of treatment, rather than on
outcome favourability and material gain.25 Other studies have shown that in practice
people do not evaluate state legitimacy in such neat categories of outputs, inputs, and
procedures (Gippert 2016; Lindgren and Persson 2010). Categorizing service delivery as
exclusively ‘output legitimacy’ may therefore be misleading in implying that improving
material well-being improves legitimacy. Here and elsewhere, service provision matters
to legitimacy in terms of not only delivering material rewards but also informing citizens’
evaluations of whether or not the state is operating in ways that are normatively fair.
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Perceptions of unfairness in even a narrow domain of service delivery may undermine
legitimacy if the resulting normative breach carries symbolic weight. Perceptions of unfair-
ness can ‘generalize’ beyond a speciﬁc sector or service arena to aﬀect overall perceptions
of state unfairness when they become symbols of wider exclusion. In the postcolonial
period, the extension of new rights to higher education was a means of transmitting
what Gupta (1995) has called the ‘main myths and symbols’ of the state – in this case,
rights and social justice. Against this baseline, the Sri Lankan standardization symbolized
both the increasing exclusion of the Tamil minority from fair access to state power and
resources and the decreasing prospects of using a fair process to remedy this exclusion
and redress grievances. Perceptions of unfair service provision may thus greatly harm
legitimacy where they symbolize such forms of discrimination.
This also implies that the fairness of who gets what, where, and how may be evaluated
in the context of expectations of rights that are historically embedded in a social contract.
In Sri Lanka, higher education was intimately tied to values, rights, and entitlements
embedded during the making of the postcolonial state. The apparent denial of these pre-
viously held rights was, as is argued elsewhere, signiﬁcant for motivating contestations of
state legitimacy (Kelman 2001, 58). The eﬀects of the changes to the rules governing entry
to university on state legitimacy were also ampliﬁed because they were viewed as an
assault on group identity. Some legitimacy theorists argue that groups are more likely
to confer legitimacy when they feel that institutional arrangements are beneﬁcial to
their group identity and self-esteem (Jost and Major 2001). The case of standardization
reverses this logic. The wider implication of these ﬁndings is that perceptions of fairness
may be relative – to what has been promised, what is expected, and what has previously
been experienced as a right.
Crucially, the standardization in this case was perceived by some as a violation of mer-
itocracy in lieu of positive discrimination. From a legitimacy perspective, it therefore
undermined the condition of ‘shared social goals’ (Schmelzle and Stollenwerk, this
issue) and was viewed by some as violating the common interest principle (Kelman
2001). Reforms that can be interpreted as an attempt to legitimize the state among its
core constituency – the rural Sinhalese – had the reverse eﬀect of contributing to de-legit-
imizing it among the Tamil minority. Legitimacy scholars have argued that policies which
violate universal rights or shared principles in this way need to ﬁnd justiﬁcation in an
alternative normative principle that is equally universally shared (Scharpf 2003). No such
alternative justiﬁcation could be found for the standardization in this case, however. Put
another way, so-called ‘performance legitimacy’ may fail if it signals that ‘government
for the people’ is government for only some of the people (Scharpf 1999). In this way,
Sri Lanka exempliﬁes the problem of multiple audiences (Zaum 2013) – that is, in multi-
ethnic, divided societies, the state’s intended legitimacy audience may not be the
whole society, and making legitimacy claims to one audience can simultaneously under-
mine legitimacy among others. Competing understanding of fairness can, in such con-
texts, have a splintering eﬀect on legitimacy.
Conclusion
This article reverses the dominant proposition underpinning statebuilding models that
service provision improves state legitimacy. It presents new empirical data to advance a
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number of conditions under which service provision can have the opposite eﬀect of de-
legitimizing a state, demonstrating the ways in which highly coveted services are lucrative
political legitimacy commodities that can be engineered to cater to the state’s core legiti-
macy audience, potentially leading to perceptions of unfairness among excluded groups.
These perceptions of unfairness in even a narrow service arena can have wider de-legiti-
mizing eﬀects because services signal the operative values and norms of the state to citi-
zens. In already divided societies, whether services support or undermine state legitimacy
may therefore hinge on competing perceptions of fairness.
These ﬁndings both challenge and reinforce the virtuous circle model under scrutiny in
this special issue. On the one hand, they call for reﬁnement of the instrumental and exclu-
sively positive framing of the relationship between ‘eﬀective’ service provision and state
legitimacy. On the other hand, they support the idea that the relationship between ser-
vices and state legitimacy is mediated by the normative criteria against which services
are assessed, by showing that service provision can undermine state legitimacy when it
violates these same criteria (Schmelzle and Stollenwerk, this issue).
Taken together, these ﬁndings call for a more political and non-material interpretation
of the relationship between services and state (de-)legitimation. Highly coveted services
are politically lucrative commodities that can be manipulated for the purpose of legitima-
tion, with the eﬀect that the circle is not always ‘virtuous’ for all groups in society. In turn,
services matter for legitimacy evaluations precisely because they represent more than just
state ‘eﬀectiveness’ and the instrumental supply of commodities and rewards. Service
provision is not exclusively a question of ‘outputs’ but also an expression and manifes-
tation of processes and values; it signals the state’s wider commitment to fairness, impar-
tiality, and the safeguarding of rights and entitlements. It is these normative qualities that
make service provision signiﬁcant to forming the moral glue between states and societies
that underpins state legitimacy. When the provision of services signals that well-being
and/or social mobility are closed oﬀ, or that the state is not committed to distributing ser-
vices and goods fairly, service provision can undermine the normative basis for state legiti-
macy such that any expected ‘virtuous’ circle unravels.
Notes
1. Citizens’ evaluations of a state’s legitimacy are typically measured by observing either their
reported beliefs or their behaviours – in other words, perceptions of the state or acts of
consent or dissent. This study combines both measures, seeking to understand the relation-
ship between acts of dissent against the state and reactions to a change in (access to) a
service. It examines public perspectives on why this change is viewed as unjustiﬁable or ille-
gitimate and why it catalyses a process of de-legitimation.
2. The present approach aligns with that of Gilley (2009); to understand the link between how
the state performs and how people evaluate its legitimacy, he studies speciﬁc policies, the pol-
itical discourses surrounding them, and public opinion surveys that indicate levels of public
approval of them.
3. Lipset (1984) for example classiﬁes the German and Austrian republics in the 1920s as having
featured high performance in combination with contested legitimacy.
4. The two insurrections were both orchestrated by the Marxist Janantha Vimukthi Peramuna
(JVP). The ﬁrst, in 1971, temporarily brought the state’s machinery to a halt and, although
unsuccessful, both took the state by surprise and represented a signiﬁcant challenge to its
authority. This was followed by a second insurrectionary attempt between 1987 and 1989,
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which resulted in a less intense but longer-lasting conﬂict (Moore 1993). Alongside these chal-
lenges from within the core, majority constituency, Sri Lanka also experienced a more
protracted, violent war between the state and sections of its Tamil minority population,
which culminated in armed conﬂict between the state and the separatist armed group, the
LTTE. This devastating war germinated after independence, escalated after 1983, and
reached a climax with the military defeat of the LTTE by the Sri Lankan military forces over
25 years later in 2009.
5. That is, one which appears anomalous to theoretical assumptions (George and Bennett 2005).
6. Language-based standardization was later replaced by a number of diﬀerent formulas based
on the birthplace of the candidates or the place where they sat the entrance exam rather than
the language in which they sat it. These schemes were: standardization according to district
(1973); standardization with district quotas (1974); and standardization with 100% district
quotas (1975).
7. It should be underscored here that grievances concerning many other areas of public policy
catalysed this de-legitimation process. The resort to armed separatism was signiﬁcantly fuelled
by the language policies under the 1956 Sinhala Only Act, reinforced by the 1972 Constitution,
which gave Buddhism a special state protection. For an in-depth exploration of these issues,
see Kearney (2011).
8. The TSF was renamed the Tamil New Tigers and later became the LTTE (Wilson 2011).
9. In 1969, some 47% of schools with science facilities up to university entrance level were con-
centrated in the provinces where English-speaking schools had clustered during the colonial
era – Northern and Western provinces (de Silva 1974, 84).
10. This statement was made by the former MP for Batticaloa, Mr A.H. Makan Makar.
11. Interview with a retired government oﬃcial, Colombo, 11 October 2014.
12. The total share of Sinhalese places in science-based courses rose from 10.6% in 1970 to 63.6%
in 1971 (‘Column 515’ 1971b).
13. It was not only the English-speaking Tamil middle classes who were disadvantaged by the
system; the main urban centres of Jaﬀna, Colombo, and Galle also lost out to Sinhalese
from rural areas.
14. The TUF was formed in early 1971 from several political groups, including the All Ceylon Tamil
Congress and, later in 1976, the Federal Party. By 1976 it had changed its name to the Tamil
United Liberation Front (TULF) and was calling for a separatist state. In 1977 it contested its
ﬁrst election on that basis, winning 18 out of 168 seats in parliament.
15. Interview with a civil society activist and retired academic, Colombo, 17 October 2014.
16. Mrs Jayaratne.
17. Mr K.P. Ratnam, representative of the Tamil district of Kayts.
18. In defence of allegations of favouring Islam – the religion of the minister of education at the
time – the press statement read: ‘The total number of Muslims getting places for Science
courses including Medicine, Engineering and Dentistry is only 23 out of a total admission of
1107. This ﬁgure tells its own story’ (‘Column 515’ 1971b).
19. In 1970, for example, students who scored a total of 227 and above in the Sinhala medium and
all students who scored a total of 250 and above in the Tamil medium were admitted to the
Peradeniya engineering degree; this amounted to a total of 86 Sinhala students and 60 Tamil
students (‘Column 515’ 1971b, columns 517–18).
20. Interview with a civil society activist and retired academic, Colombo, 17 October 2014.
21. Interview with a senior academic and former activist, Colombo, 7 October 2014.
22. A large volume of academic work has examined the causes and consequences of Sri Lanka’s
civil war. Among them are Bush (2003), DeVotta (2004), Bastian (2013), and the edited volume
of Manor (1984).
23. Interview with a prominent Tamil businessperson, Colombo, 29 April 2016.
24. See note 22 above.
25. Fisk and Cherney (2016) operationalize procedural fairness as respectful treatment, voice, and
neutrality, while distributive justice is recorded as whether or not certain castes and income
groups receive better services than the poor.
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